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Since 1945, approximately half of the world’s states have been engaged in some type of 
civil conflict. The aim of this research is to understand why some post-civil war states fail to 
establish peace durability while others thrive. Through quantitative research of civil wars 
globally and a qualitative analysis of Iraq, this thesis argues for the necessity of post-civil war 
policy to focus on the renewal of domestic infrastructure in addition to military investment which 
suppresses grievance-driven violence. A logistical regression model of all civil wars since 1945 
shows that variables, such as healthcare, are evidently associated with more durable peace while 
military has a positive relationship with re-engagement in civil war. Applying this research 
through a policy recommendation, it is clear that, despite foreign involvement and the influence 
of terrorism, favoring a rebuilding of domestic infrastructure rather than solely military 















Since 1945, approximately half of the world’s states have been engaged in some type of 
civil conflict (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004). It appears that conflict is ubiquitous throughout 
history and inevitable in our future. But, it is possible to critically evaluate the various types of 
rebellions and war resolutions that could help to facilitate peace. The study of civil conflict and 
peace durability is essential not only because it can save lives, but also because it can prevent 
future conflict and indirectly improve the lives and conditions of individuals around the world. 
By understanding how peace durability after civil war is established, it effectively informs the 
steps that government leaders take to rebuild and maintain their state after civil war. Each civil 
war death reflects lives lost and the countless lives of others affected by that loss. When 
reviewing recent armed conflict, one civil conflict may stand out more prominently than others 
for many American and Iraqi citizens alike: Operation Iraqi Freedom. Operation Iraqi Freedom 
was a case that varied in terms of military and domestic infrastructure investment. Additionally, 
the duration of this conflict, combined with the rise of ISIL (Islamic State of Iraq and the 
Levant) that followed in the same geographic region brings special attention and need to evaluate 
this case.   
Operation Iraqi Freedom (renamed to Operation New Dawn in September 2010) was a 
nine-year protracted armed conflict, also known as the Second Iraq War. In March 2003, the 
United States invaded Iraq to overthrow the rule of Saddam Hussein and reducing the global 
impact of terrorism. The United States’ enduring military involvement in Iraq not only created a 
power vacuum by expelling land-controlling VNSAs (Violent Non-State Actors) and 
systematically dismantling the Iraqi governments functionally capabilities, but it also situated the 
United States to serve as a third-party to facilitate peace and democratic practices in the nation 
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after war. These efforts were not without the assistance of the new American-appointed Iraqi 
government. The budget expenditures of the new Iraqi government provide evidence that the 
Iraqi government was assisting foreign military efforts to re-stabilize the state, establish peace, 
and combat Violent Non-State Actors. According to the Inter-Agency Information and Analysis 
Unit at the Joint Analysis Policy Unit, between 2004-2005 the New Iraqi Military (NIM) 
received a budget increase of approximately 315% (2013). While NIM had a dramatic increase 
in funds and resources, the outcome of freedom and democracy in Iraq saw no change (Inter-
Agency Information and Analysis Unit at the Joint Analysis Policy Unit, 2013). The conditions 
inside Iraq continued to decline during this time. In May 2005, according the Global Internal 
Displacement database, Iraq had thousands of displaced persons and a lack of medical supplies 
and aid as well as environmental concerns for families stranded in the desert (2019).  
At first, one many be inclined to attribute Iraq’s inability to re-stabilize to presence of 
insurgency alone. However, this argument can be quickly debunked as a U.S. military air strike 
killed many prominent leaders of Al-Qaeda, but this did not aid or reassure re-stabilization of the 
state, as will be evidenced later in this thesis. Rather, the influence of strategic investment 
decisions affected the country’s ability to restabilize which may have provided the opportunity 
for insurgency. Thus, after Iraq’s attempted stabilization post-Second Iraq War, allowed the 
structural opportunity for terrorism to thrive. After ISIL captured the city of Mosul, the Iraqi 
government was able to regain control in July of 2017. Although news outlets report that the 
presence of ISIL is shrinking, military forces are still vigilant.  As of March 2019, there are an 
estimated 14,000 to 18,000 ISIL militants still occupying Iraq and Syria (British Broadcasting 
Corporation, 2019). Yet, as this thesis will argue, the investment strategies of Iraq indicate that 
the country may not be approaching stabilization despite the defeat of ISIL. Thus, a question 
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which prompted the following research is: if it was not terrorism causing the instability in Iraq, 
then what occurs in the post-civil conflict reconstruction process that results in a lack of durable 
peace?  
While this question drives the research, it is important to note that each civil war is a 
special case that has unique factors which distinguish it from others. Operation Iraqi Freedom is 
no exception and it should be addressed according to specific events which contributed to its lack 
of durable peace. This is evident in Iraq’s distinctive history and the destructive process of de-
Ba’athification the country encountered following the United States influence. After de-
Ba’athification, a primary element of attempted stabilization during the Iraq War that stood out 
was the continued investment in NIM and military resources without fortification of domestic 
infrastructure. A fortification of infrastructure, in this paper, will refer to a more equal 
investment in domestic infrastructure as compared to military. Historically, post-civil war 
investment as has been particularly advantageous for the military. As the following thesis will 
discuss, the military investment and healthcare investment increased or decreased in equal parts 
despite increased fighting and needs for medical aid for most of 2003-2014.  Investment in NIM 
continued to rise while the lives of individuals were still in disrepair. In 2009, when the United 
States began to withdraw troops there were still active attacks and improvised explosive devices 
(IEDs) being used to target schools and students (Global Coalition to Protect Education from 
Attack, 2018).   
Initially, it may appear shocking that military investment was unable to yield more 
promising results in Iraq. Logically, one expects that the short-term mitigation of violence due to 
increased security to also be applicable in the long-run. Yet, the disappointing outcome of non-
durable peace may be expected given further investigation. If there is disproportionate 
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investment in military (or unequal investment in domestic infrastructure and military that does 
not reflect the country’s needs), such was the case for NIM, then the individuals of a country are 
still experiencing the same grievances that drove them to war in the first place. Regardless of the 
number of boots on the ground or the advanced weaponry of the troops, soldiers are unable to 
teach children or provide economic prosperity to the citizens feeling the effects of civil war. If 
their government is unable to win the hearts and minds of the people, then likewise, they will be 
unable to re-stabilize the state. It seems unlikely that a government which cannot provide its 
citizens with resources for the prospect of a decent life is likely to transition out of the power 
vacuum formed because the insurgency may be filling the gaps of resources that the government 
is not providing.  For example, according to the European Institute of Peace, many individuals 
associated with terrorist group al-Shabab are largely involved for economic reasons in addition 
to the feelings of belonging and responsibility which accompany it (2018).  
The notion that post-civil war peace durability is best established when military and 
domestic infrastructure increases in at least equal parts does not exclude the fact that safety and 
protection of a state’s people is an essential element to being able to acquire resources to rebuild 
their life and their family. The military, in many instances, can be the driving force that does just 
that. The thesis does suggest, however, that states which invest a higher percentage of their 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in domestic infrastructure alongside military investment will 
achieve a more durable peace after the civil war has ended. Similarly, the works of Badran 
(2014) establish that well-constructed peace agreements are, in fact, more useful than solely 
military victories. This suggests, at minimum, the negotiation by states and citizens for goods 
and services beyond what the military can provide is an essential component of durable peace. 
Military victories permit control of the people on the non-winning side by the winning coalition, 
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creating dramatic asymmetries in power that increase the likelihood of retaliation in normal 
conflict let alone civil conflict which may already be driven by a power imbalance (Badran, 
2014). The size of the winning coalition is statistically significant regarding its impact on peace 
durability in post-civil war states because the larger the size of the winning coalition the more 
individuals there are who are likely to be in agreement on how to proceed in state rebuilding, 
even if the rebuilding does not reflect equality or equity in distribution on rights and resources. 
Thus, the following thesis argues that winning the hearts and minds of citizens through 
establishing long term peace may be more important than originally considered by conflict and 
peace scholars. Since peace can be established non-violently, as it often is with the influence of 
the  United Nations, the best way to achieve the desired long-term peace may be through aid 
such as domestic infrastructure fortification. 
This thesis proceeds in four distinct chapters to assist the argument that states who invest 
a higher percentage of their GDP in domestic infrastructure alongside military investment will 
achieve a more durable peace after civil war. First, there is a discussion of the context and 
literature regarding civil war, military investment, domestic infrastructure investment, and peace 
durability. Secondly, there is a macro-level statistical analysis and quantitative investigation of 
all civil conflict post-1945. It will evaluate the correlation of peace durability to percentages of 
military and domestic infrastructure investment while controlling for time after a state was no 
longer engaged in civil conflict. Thirdly, there is a qualitative analysis of how the conclusions 
drawn in the quantitative chapter may be applied directly to Iraq. Lastly, there will be a brief 
policy brief regarding Iraq War which considers which factors set it apart from other civil 




Literature Review & Rationale  
Context: Civil War 
Civil war is multifaceted phenomenon comprising of several different definitions, ways 
to measure it, and factors that directly affect it. Regan (1996), for example, defines civil war or 
intrastate conflict as sustained combat between groups within state boundaries with at least 200 
fatalities. However, many researchers argue that this threshold is too high and will not record 
events such as coups, riots, and other demonstrations symbolizing a conflict within the state. For 
the sake of this research the definition used is 25 or more battle related death according with the 
UCDP/PRIO Dataset (Peace Research Institute Oslo, 2018). Furthermore, whether a state is 
engaged in coups, riots, demonstrations or civil war, military and domestic infrastructure can 
contribute in differing capacities to the onset and reduction of these violences. Domestic 
infrastructure-related influence may include factors such as education, healthcare, religious 
polarization, systemic democratic processes and in many cases a hybrid combination of these 
factors. For example, Reynal-Querol (2002) suggests that there is a positive correlation between 
religious polarization and the onset of civil war. It is also important to notice that religious 
polarization, specifically, can be seen to have a positive significant correlation with civil war, 
whereas religious fragmentation is not of statistical significance (Reynal-Querol, 2002). 
Polarization is related to the intensity of belief that one holds in opposition to others whereas 
fragmentation pertains to the proportions of different types of religious individuals living in 
proximity to another. Yet, it is also possible to believe that some of this religious polarization 
may be attributed to a lack of systemic democratic processes (a factor of domestic infrastructure) 
prohibiting expression or lack of educational systems promoting conflict resolution. Thus, in the 
same way that military and domestic infrastructure influence on civil war are intertwined, so are 
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the factors of domestic infrastructure intertwined on themselves. Governmental investment in 
education is thought to have a dramatic impact on reducing religious polarization and increasing 
conflict resolution skills (Abu-Nimer & Nasser, 2017). The presence of highly-funded education 
systems with curricula that meets the global standard of education is shown to possess a negative 
correlation to the onset of civil war. These domestic infrastructure-related factors will be disused 
in further detail in the below paragraphs. 
Another consideration that is seen to be influential in civil war is the vague notion of the 
inclusiveness of the political system (Reynal-Querol, 2005). Inclusiveness of the political system 
can be thought of in terms of how much the political system allows equity between voices. This 
has been especially significant when measuring ethnic civil wars or countries engaged in war 
while experiencing reinforcing cleavages. Depending on whether a country and its citizens feel 
as though they are being heard contributes to how the government is viewed by those citizens. 
This type of understanding could, then, potentially relate to post-civil war peace durability since 
a state’s citizenry may not be inclined to invest themselves in peace building if they feel as 
though the government officials do not perceive their concerns as legitimate  
The above explains specific outside factors which contribute to the development of civil 
war. The following paragraphs, however, will analyze what motivates individuals to turn to civil 
war as a solution to their grievances. When analyzing peace durability post-civil war, it is 
important to look at what the causes of civil war are because this what may be leading to the re-
engagement in civil war or a lack of durable peace. Attempting to explain the overall cause or 
motivation for civil war leads two primary theories: the greed and the grievance model. The 
greed model is when combatants are motivated by the goal of advancing their own situation and 
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self-enrichment (DeRouen, Jr. and DeRouen, 2014). The grievance model is conflict motivated 
by ethnicity, religion and socio-economics (DeRouen, Jr. and DeRouen, 2014).  
The greed model is driven by the desire for private gains and is an excellent incentive for 
rebel leaders to stage rebellions (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004). Additionally, Collier and Hoeffler 
(2004) argue that when rebellions are expected bring about tangible benefits, the possibility of 
war increases. The greed model of civil war can be thought of in contrast to the grievance model, 
which will be a primary theory relied upon in this thesis. The grievance model suggests civil war 
is brought about by unresolved grievances. In ethno-religious conflicts, elites are often able to 
persuade masses to rise up violently because individuals have a cause that they are directly 
involved in and passionate for (Gurr, 1993). Typically, many ethno-religious tensions have been 
in existence for substantial amounts of time, so leaders are able to mobilize these groups 
predicated upon these traditionally-entrenched grievances. Through further exploration by 
evaluating regional breakdowns of the Uppsala Conflict Data Program at Peace Research 
Institute Oslo (UCDP/PRIO database) and World Bank, it is revealed that civil wars are more 
common in regions with higher poverty rates such as countries in Africa and Asia. In these cases, 
inequitable distribution of resources may encourage individuals to use civil war as to express or 
solve their severe grievances (2018). Alternative indirect motivations such as the rise of a 
tyrannical leader or new government policy that sharply discriminates against one group may 
also convert frustration to violence. Gurr (1993) concluded that grievances cause ethno-religious 
civil war through using the Minorities at Risk (MAR) database. Agreeing with the conclusions of 
Gurr (1993), which states that ethno-religious wars are caused by external factors acting on 
already-present inequalities, Banton (1983) suggests that this manipulation by elites to mobilize 




 Military investment may encompass many different mechanisms ranging from the 
number of soldiers to the number of weapons. This does not exclude military technology, 
military presence and allies; each of these factors can contribute to civil war in varying 
capacities. Investment in military, which may be analyzed in different ways such as the size of 
the coalition, the size of the military, and the advancement of the military’s weapons all play a 
crucial part in re-establishing peace. The below paragraphs explore how the military’s 
involvement and state’s subsequent investment in military affect peace durability.  
 One of the main elements of military investment that is more easily measured is the size 
of the coalition or the amount of military personnel. The size of the coalition is how many 
individuals in a particular country or defined area are siding with a political group or 
organization. There are wide-ranging influences that the coalition force can have since a large 
military force often occurs in the presence of other attributing factors such as another, possibly 
opposing strong military force and civil unrest. This is because the more individuals that are 
members of the military, the more monetary investment there is to compensate the soldiers and 
supply them each equally as well. Additionally, when talking about the settlement post-civil war, 
Joshi (2013) found that among several different military-related factors, the size of winning-
coalition in civil war had a statistically significant impact on peace durability, regardless of other 
military or domestic infrastructure-related security variables. This means that if the side which 
one civil war was large, this would positive impact how long the peace lasted. This is most likely 
due to the idea that, as mentioned above, there are more individuals to side with the government 
in power and there are then more or a majority of individuals to agree with the policy being put 
in place. Soldiers are fundamental to the capacity of a military and thus a large military may also 
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be equipped with an intense military force. This is important to recognize because large military 
forces may serve as a precursor for other public and private benefits. An example would be 
increased protection in certain areas. On the other hand, military strength may not be beneficial 
to everyone as it can serve as a limitation for insurgents attempting to gain control because rebels 
must first have enough strength to challenge government control before they are able to provide 
the military strength or collective goods comparable with what the government was providing 
(Wood, 2014). Alternative research suggests that while investment in military may be considered 
beneficial, there still are alternative incentivizing factors to balance military strength such as 
security and access to parallel governance systems that would also encourage loyalty and 
recruitment (Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith, 2004). Since the size of the coalition is significant, this 
suggests that when terrorism has presence in civil war, the government may be more likely to 
take different routes, such as economic intervention, rather than military intervention to fight the 
opposing side (Butcher, 2016). Economic intervention may be a plausible solution for many 
governments not wanting to intervene militarily because research suggests that greater military 
troops and advanced technologies increase the capability of destruction, but they do not 
independently create the incentive structure for violence (Wood, 2014). 
Heger (2017) addresses the impact of coalition from another perspective by tracing the 
negative relation of the size of the winning coalition to the intensity of war. The size of the 
winning coalition is different from peace durability in itself, but it is related in that it affects war. 
Therefore, understanding what drives the civil war may lend insight into what will need to be 
addressed or should be considered during peacetime in order to smooth over grievances for a 
sustainable amount of time. Heger (2017) hypothesizes the reason for the relationship between a 
large winning coalition and low intensity war is the provision of public goods. This is because as 
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the size of the coalition increases, they can provide more public goods, such as affordable 
healthcare, food, and education, as opposed to private goods (which tended to have higher 
prices) to the citizens (Heger, 2017). Government-provided goods are preferred by the citizens 
for the relative inexpensiveness and efficiency of the good and, therefore, when individuals are 
receiving the goods that they need at an attainable price, the intensity of the war diminishes. The 
mutually beneficial relationship between the winning coalition leaders and followers creates 
loyalty and support. 
Lastly, alliances in civil war are also a telling factor in relation to military investment. As 
alliances continue to form throughout civil war, it appears that they generally aggravate violence 
regardless of cross-cutting or reinforcing cleavages in society (Weidmann, 2014).  This sheds 
light upon what the root causes are of war in countries that are ethnically or religiously divided. 
In such instances, increased violence can be attributed to the presence of alliances rather than 
shared territory.  
Domestic Infrastructure 
While there is an unquestionable argument that military presence impacts civil war and 
can help reduce its intensity in certain cases, there is also convincing evidence for the presence 
of non-military related factors or domestic infrastructure. Not only are aspects of domestic 
infrastructure intertwined within the military aspects, but they also have independent direct 
effects on the outcomes of the civil war. Domestic infrastructure influences regarding civil war 
can include a wide variety of developing situations such as economic intervention, wealth, 




A main domestic infrastructure-related effect on civil war is economic intervention by the 
government. Recent studies support the effectiveness and influence of domestic infrastructure on 
civil war by showing that if military intervention is not a viable option, then many governments 
may rely on the use of economic intervention to attempt to win the war (Butcher, 2016). 
Realizing the different and effective ways to combat an opposition are important especially when 
considering the necessity of assimilation of the opposing side back into the state after the war. 
Thus, economics also plays a large role in civil war. During election time, incumbent 
government officials fear that they may lose access to main sources of revenue, such as oil, if 
they do not secure their spot again, so this may influence the tension and alliances formed during 
this period (Martel 2016). 
In addition to wealth, another contributing domestic infrastructure-related factor to civil 
war is the attempted establishment or threat of democracy. Another perspective on Martel (2016) 
shows that elections intended to be democratic may, in reality, be corrupt if the voters are under 
pressure or threat. In a study which evaluated the presence of UN (United Nations) peacekeepers 
in civil conflict nations found that countries with UN peacekeepers were more able to establish 
democratic voting practices (Joshi, 2013). These practices were essential to durable peace 
because it allowed all parties to express their sentiments and stances on individual leaders and 
policies. (Joshi, 2013).  However, these results should be understood while taking into account 
that UN peacekeepers have a certain level of political legitimacy because they are backed by 
international support which may influence how their democratic processes are interpreted (Joshi, 
2013). Additionally, Joshi (2013) finds that the establishment of democracy was one of the best 
methods to ensure the survival of peace and suggests that the presence of United Nations 
peacekeeping force played a crucial role. This is significant because the non-violent nature of the 
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UN supports that notion that military power may not be a required component of peace 
durability. 
Education has a large impact on civil war and the subsequent peace durability as well. 
While public school systems serve as a great place to distribute propaganda and teach 
nationalistic pride, they also serve many different purposes in relation to peace durability. 
Specifically, there has been much success in incorporating peace education into schools in the 
Middle East. Designed intervention plans focusing on incorporating conflict resolution into the 
curriculum were implemented in various schools and Quranic schools. The students and teachers 
participated in workshops emphasizing the necessity of empathy and conflict management. The 
teachers and students felt more equipped and inclined to handle conflict peacefully (Abu-Nimer 
& Nasser, 2017). In another example, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), one of the world’s 
leading countries in human development, recently prioritized the necessity of education. In 1970, 
only approximately 48% of their citizens were literate. Today their literacy rate is approximately 
93% with near equality between men and women (Crown Prince Court). This is due in no small 
part to the UAE developing a new education plan for all the emirates and each one unique to the 
different groups of people inside of the respective emirates. These regional differences can be 
accounted for in the case of the UAE, but there are clear challenges to using education to have a 
positive impact on peace durability. Attempting to come up with a unique and different plan for 
every school in each region, considering that schools and populations may vary widely from one 
small region to the next is extremely difficulty and time consuming (Abu-Nimer & Nasser, 
2017). Additionally, acquiring the resources may be another potential challenge. However, these 
drawbacks are not to discount the positive impact that education has in the role of civil conflict 
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and peace durability. Overall, increased government funding towards education should be able to 
make up for the amount of time and complexity in implementing more wholistic education plans.  
Finally, a cornerstone of domestic infrastructure is healthcare. Healthcare is widely 
considered to be one of the fundamental rights provided to all individuals without discrimination. 
Thus, the organized provision of this human right by a government becomes instrumental in the 
citizen’s perception of the government’s stability and domestic infrastructure. Since healthcare, a 
human right, is often provided by the government, the provision or non-provision of it to citizens 
may have a dramatic effect on the violence. In United Nations General Assembly Resolution 
34/58 it stated “Peace and security, in their turn, are important for the preservations and 
improvement of the health of all people, and the cooperation among nations on vital health issues 
can contribute importantly to peace,” which underscores the necessity for healthcare to be 
understood as not only necessary to healthy domestic infrastructure, but also the foundation of 
durable peace (United Nations General Assembly, 34th sess.: 1979-1980, 1979). Sherin (2018) 
points out the presence of a bilateral relationship between peace and healthcare is because they 
both have a fundamental link to inalienable rights. While there is a clear gap in literature 
regarding the ways in which healthcare is directly linked via data to more peaceful outcomes in 
civil war, there is a clear theoretical link. Healthcare is linked to unalienable human rights, thus 
when healthcare is denied so is a human right. This deprivation of a human right, over time, can 
stir up grievances which lead to civil war. Such intersectionality between these two variables was 






Peace Durability  
 Peace durability is quintessentially measured as the length of time a country will be 
engaged in peace after no longer being considered engaged in conflict. Therefore, the theoretical 
understanding of peace durability is centered around how long that peace, or length of time a 
country is no longer engaged in civil war, is able to last before a return to war ensues. Peace 
durability can have many influencing factors ranging from negotiated settlement, third party 
involvement, and cultural values. There are also studies that suggest that in repeating civil wars 
when peace durability is not occurring, that the same factors that were present and incited 
violence in the first civil war may make the second civil war begin (Walter, 2011). Some 
research suggests that a well negotiated peace agreement is far superior to a military victory 
because a military victory creates asymmetry in the government which leads to inevitable 
downfall because of the lack of inclusiveness (Joshi, 2013; Reynal-Querol, 2002). Time and time 
again, the negotiated settlement is found to be statically significant and essential to establishing 
democracy which leads to durable peace (Joshi, 2013). While, at first, a negotiated peace 
settlement may seem like an obvious answer because a military victory is not capable of 
surmounting the limitations to peace as efficiently as peace agreement, there is a concern with 
this theory. This assumes that all impediments to peace are known when negotiating a peaceful 
settlement. Certainly, this is not true. While some impediments to peace, such as sectarian 
violence for example, may be able to be accounted for in customized negotiations, there can still 
be unforeseen actions like civil unrest that occur. Like Abu-Nimer & Nasser attempting to 
implement conflict management in schools in the Middle East, they had a difficult time creating 
a specialized and appropriate plan for each school because they had to accounted for such 
decentralized school systems (2017). To practically institute durable peace, assuming all issues 
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cannot be adequately accounted for due too human error, there must be other realistic, yet 
sustainable ways to form durable peace.  
As mentioned in the discussion of domestic infrastructure, negotiated settlements are 
much more likely to lead to democracy and then foster durable peace (Joshi, 2013). This is 
important to take into consideration because the coalition size is certainly important in 
determining who will win, but the peace durability is founded on the idea of equity and political 
inclusiveness when making decisions (Reynal-Querol, 2002). This is supported by research that 
suggests that conflicts are most likely to recur when combatants on either side are not able to 
decisively defeat the other, nor able to implement mutually acceptable agreements (Walter, 
2011). An alternative explanation for the success of negotiated settlements includes that 
negotiations are necessary so that the individuals affected by civil war or with preexisting 
grievances can voice what they need. Thus, the presence of a negotiated settlement may in some 
cases be the presence of individuals grievances being heard and resolved.  
Law is also seen as playing a large role in peace durability. Walter (2011) suggests that 
governments which are constrained by a constitution and follow the rule of law are less likely to 
be reengaged in violence of any type. Additionally, measures that limit the government’s power 
to rule outside of the law and take up unilateral power are perceived as attractive by the 
negotiating power and therefore leads to an increased chance of peace negotiation. This offers 
combatants as alternative way out of war. This type of research suggests that there may be a 
necessary shift toward political, rather than military or economic intervention into civil war 
which has been the status quo until now.  
The shift toward political intervention into civil war rather than economic and military-
based intervention is important in creating sustainable and durable peace. The overall aim by of 
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peace building, as stated by Reychler (2002) in the Peace and Conflict Studies Journal, “…to 
create a win-win situation or a mutually benefiting sense of interdependence between all the 
parties involved and to embed the peace building into institutions that reinforce and sustain the 
process.” This approach is necessary to ensure that the peace being established is neither by force 
or from threat of an overpowering coalition.  
Rationale 
Previous civil war literature suggests that violent outbreaks or civil war recurrences can 
be motivated by desire for more, as in the greed model, or because of unmet needs, as in the 
grievance model (DeRouen, Jr. & DeRouen, 2014). Since civil war can be spurred by unmet 
needs of the population, such as in the case of the grievance model, I predict that durability of 
peace increases when needs are met (DeRouen, Jr. & DeRouen, 2014). These needs are met 
through the provision of domestic infrastructure, as opposed to augmented military investment or 
presence. When there is violence spurred by grievance, renewing the military will temporarily 
subdue the violence logistically, but it cannot resolve the issues in the long run. Thus, violence 
will be more likely to reoccur. However, to understand why there is not the provision of 
domestic infrastructure after civil war, one must critically evaluate the strategic leadership 
behind the decision to invest in military, domestic infrastructure, or both.  
Looking at the ways in which strategic leadership affects the investment of military and 
domestic infrastructure reveals why there has been a constant skewedness toward military 
investment. An analysis of the leaders’ mindset post-civil war affects the strategic decision-
making process and will provide the primary motives of logical strategic decision making and 
how these decision affect citizens. The following section further explains the intersectionality 
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between a leader’s choice to invest in military or domestic infrastructure and the resulting peace 
durability.  
From the strategic standpoint, when a country exits civil-war, it is not illogical for the 
leader of that country to invest monetarily in increasing security forces around the state since the 
leverage of this human capital and security technology may mitigate violent outbreak in the 
short-term (Herman, 2015).Yet, this increase in security reduces the structural capacity for 
violence without addressing the underlying grievances to improve social conditions. The 
reasoning behind the incapacity of security to address grievances is attributed to the greed v. 
grievance model as discussed in the literature review. The primary understanding of the greed 
model of civil war is thought to be rooted in the desire of one side to initiate a civil war because 
of the desire and predicted ability to gain more than they currently have. Although one may be 
inclined to think that such violence spurred by the greed model would result in peace time 
incapable of being augmented by domestic infrastructure investment -this is not true. Even in the 
case of the greed model, there will still be a population effected by the actions of the opposing 
side. Once again, these actions will result in the presence of grievances that need to be addressed 
by the controlling government. The grievances of the citizens are surrounded by their basic needs 
not being met by the government. Therefore, when there is larger investment in the domestic 
infrastructure and the needs of the population or the effected part of it are being met, then the 
violence will be less likely to reoccur. Durable peace becomes more likely in these situations 
where there is a higher investment in domestic infrastructure than military. 
With this rational, one might consider the literature discussed above that explains that 
negotiated settlements are less likely to reenter violence as a further confirmation of this rational. 
The literature reveals that settlements in which both sides are able to voice their needs are the 
 
25 
ones that result in more durable peace (Joshi, 2013). This pattern of peace durability evolution 
may be explained by the notion that negotiated settlements result in a situation in which both 
parties have agreed, to some extent, what the process of durable peace with materialize as in their 
lives as well as to uphold peace if agreed-upon settlement is satisfied by the government. In a 
negotiated settlement, there is a clear expectation of what will occur and what measures will be 
taken to appease or recover both parties. Then, as both parties have negotiated what how their 
needs should be met, the result is a lower likelihood of recurrent civil war. 
The reason that this strategy is not used by many nations is because fortifying domestic 
infrastructure amidst dwindling violence is not an obvious solution from the strategic leadership 
stand point. As a post-civil war leader, there may seem to be natural incentive by augmenting 
physical threat with physical security resources because there is an observed absence of conflict, 
but this action is not resolution of violence. Based upon the argument that civil war (spurred by 
greed and grievance) have perpetuated or renewed grievances that are only partially tamed by the 
provision of domestic infrastructure, then investment in domestic infrastructure by the 
controlling government in equal or advanced amounts as compared to investment in military 
should result in more durable peace. Since negotiated settlements may serve as evidence in 
support of this hypothesis, then it is not illogical to predict that government investment in non-
traditional security factors, at the right ratio in proportion to GDP and traditional security 
investment will result in a decreased recurrence of violent outbreak. The rationale concludes, that 
since civil war sparked by grievance, and even greed-related factors, results in a citizenry that is 
fight for increased provision of domestic infrastructure related goods, although physical security 
measures seem to be the logical solution because it temporarily mitigates violence; it is not a 
permeant solution. Rather, not addressing the grievances of the citizenry will result in a 
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reengagement of civil war and lack of peace durability because the physical security only 
temporarily addresses the outcome of the civil war, not the root cause. So, when a leader invests 
more heavily in domestic infrastructure post-civil war, there will be a greater likelihood of peace 
durability because the root causes of the civil war are being address and the resolution of 
violence and increased peace durability will therefore follow.  
Quantitative Investigation: The Roles of Military and Domestic Infrastructure in 
Peace Durability since 1945 
The quantitative analysis of the roles of military and domestic infrastructure reviews the 
possibility that investment in domestic infrastructure, opposed to sole or primary investment in 
military security, post-civil war will increase the likelihood of peace durability as discussed in 
the rationale. The use of data enables a high-level and far-reaching analysis of the proposed 
theory. By evaluating globally each case of post-civil war peace that also had complete data 
regarding specific domestic infrastructure-related and military-related variables (detailed below) 
this allows for a general conclusion about the impact of domestic infrastructure in facilitating 
peace durability.  
Existing Quantitative Evidence 
 There is substantial previous research and ground work about civil war and the influence 
of different variables. Specifically, variables such as GDP-per capita and the polity score, or how 
a government is ranked numerically on a scale ranging from completely democratic to 
completely autocratic, have been widely studied. There are two main conclusions about the 
relation of these two variables to the likelihood of civil-war that should be also be considered in 
the evaluation. Understanding the known outcomes of specific variables and how they play a part 
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in civil war will illuminate possible patterns in the application of other variables, such as those 
related to military and domestic infrastructure.  
 The relation between the regime type of a nation measured through the polity score has 
been established by many scholars suggesting that regimes that are either pure democracy or 
pure autocracy are those least susceptible to civil war (DeNardo, 2014; Muller & Weede, 1990; 
Fein, 1995; Ellingsen & Gleditsch, 1997; Regan & Henderson, 2002; Abouharb & Cingranelli, 
2007; Vreeland, 2008). The basis for many of these arguments is stemmed from some of the 
earliest work about regime type and civil war which discussed structural opportunities for dissent 
groups to take advantage of. Multiple investigations found that regimes that were neither 
democratic and collaborative nor democratic without opportunity for action were most 
susceptible to civil war. Those regimes that tend towards the middle of scale and are part 
democratic and part dictatorship are commonly referred to as anocratic. In the past two decades 
studies by Hegre et al. (2001) and Fearon & Latin (2003) have been published that confirm the 
above argument which is now commonly referred to as the “anocracy hypothesis.” Thus, the 
expectation is to see that the polity score is a significant variable in determining the likelihood of 
post-civil war peace in the quantitative investigation of global civil wars as outlined below. 
 Another variable that expected to be significant in determining the likelihood of civil war 
is GDP per capita. GDP per capita, along with other variables such as infant mortality, are 
variables that capture economic well-being. Many studies have shown that the lower the 
economic well-being of a nation the higher the likelihood of civil war onset (Fearon & Laitin, 
2003; Sambanis, 2004; Collier & Hoeffler, 1998, 2004). If economic well-being is significant in 
the onset of civil war, then one may predict that it will also be a factor of high consideration 
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when predicting the likelihood that there will be a civil war onset again, after peace. This reveals 
that lower the GDP per capita is, the less likely peace durability should be. 
Methodology     
To understand how increased or balanced investment in domestic infrastructure in 
relation to investment in military impacts durability of peace, I will create a model that tests the 
influence of the independent variables (amount of investment in domestic infrastructure or 
military) on the dependent variable (re-engaged in civil war or not). The logistical regression 
model will test the influence of several domestic infrastructure factors (healthcare, education, 
and social welfare) and their influence on peace durability post-civil war. This replicates the 
well-known model completed by Walter (2002). The base model includes variables measuring 
time since the end of the last civil war, polity, and polity durability. This model includes controls 
for time standard to the literature and controls for the underlying baseline hazard rate. This 
model will measure the following hypothesis:   
H: As public infrastructure support (IV) increases in relation to investment in military 
 post-civil war, the length of peace time (DV) will increase.  
The unit of analysis for this model is a year that a country is not engaged in civil war post 
a civil war episode throughout 1945-2015. An observation enters that data when the civil 
violence ends and stays until violence reemerges. This yielded 30,254 episodes and excludes 
countries in constant civil conflict because this model is measuring the effect of durability of 
peace and a state in constant war has not yet experienced an episode of peace. A country must 
first be engaged in civil war because the research is measuring how a government’s choices 
affects the durability of peace. The only way for peace to break down again, is if there has 




 The dependent variable will be measured through UCDP/PRIO Uppsala Database (Peace 
Research Institute Oslo, 2019). This data base codes a violent outbreak as 25 or more deaths 
which is a threshold high enough to account for violent outbreaks without ignoring outbreaks to 
the extent that it becomes rare. This is coded as a binary variable whether or not the country is 
engaged in civil war. In the database used for this research, a country enters the database when it 
is in peace time and drops out of the population when it encounters violence again. This data in 
this model measures peace durability post-civil war.  
Independent Variables 
The independent variables will be measured through the government’s distribution of 
money or ratio of government investment into the said variable out of annual spending budget. A 
primary reason for this type of measurement is because money is zero sum. Money invested in 
the military is money not invested in the school systems for example. Thus, looking at a 
country’s investment will measure the government’s choices. Additionally, using the investment 
as a ratio can help offset apparent differences between countries’ investments in civil war. Using 
investment as a ratio also complements the notion that investment is zero sum. 
GDP per capita will be assessed in US dollars. GDP per capita can help to assess the level 
of development of a country while the ratio allows an equal analysis of the amount of investment 
from country to country. This information comes from the World Bank (2018). Many of the 
countries that are engaged in civil war repeatedly tend to be countries that are not well tracked. 
The final number able to be assessed with accurate information ranges from 791-1,860 
observations dependent on the information being analyzed. This variable is included as a control.  
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The timesince variable which codes for years in peace since the last civil war episode. 
This counts upwards numerically and will reset if the state exits the database because a 
breakdown of peace occurred Thus, the expectation is that the higher the increase in time since 
civil war, the less likely the country is likely to be re-engaged in civil war. Following the 
controls for time, the next variable measured is the polity. The polity scores are recorded in the 
regression base model. Polity is analyzed on a scale of -10 to 10, autocracy to consolidated 
democracy, respectively. Polity captures global trends of governance at a high level by 
measuring the authority within a state. The polity score captures the regime authority and this 
measure of -10 to 10 is reported by the Polity IV Project (Systematic Peace, 2016). It is predicted 
that anocracy (close to zero on the polity scale) is closely related with the onset of political 
instability.  
Education investment will look at the amount of money that is invested in primary and 
tertiary education after or between civil violence. This, too, will be a percentage of GDP. There 
are certainly many ways and sub-areas of education to concentrate in such a primary, secondary, 
tertiary education, or even designated scholarship money. However, for this research a high-level 
analysis will suffice. It will show the amount of money that is being given to help promote 
education which captures how the government’ choices regarding money allocation affect the 
peace durability. This data will be extracted from the World Bank database (2018). This variable 
is selected to measure domestic infrastructure since education is a variable that is represented 
yearly in state’s budget. Accordingly, it is simple to see how the budget is adjusted and track the 
changes as the historical events occur.  
Health investment is also measured as a portion of GDP. Like the previous two variables, 
using money as the measurement will analyze the government’s choice to invest in public health. 
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This information is taken from the World Bank website as well (2018). Health investment is the 
other variable that is selected to measure domestic infrastructure alongside education. Like 
health investment, it is clear to track the fluctuation in health investment and cross reference it 
with specific historical events. The result is that it clear to see the ways the health investment 
impacts the citizens and the stability of a country. Unlike many of the alternative variables 
related to domestic infrastructure which were mentioned in the literature review, health and 
education are observable by the amount of money a government chooses to invest. This is 
essential to making an educated conclusion about the data and the impact of the domestic 
infrastructure on post-civil war durability.  
Military will be measured by the amount of government spending invested in military 
between civil wars. These numbers will come the World Bank (2018). Like education and health, 
it is measured as the percentage of GDP that is invested in order to capture how investment 
choices affect the government. Regarding interaction with the dependent variable, the likelihood 
that a state will re-engage in civil war, it is predicted that high levels of investment in military 
will result in a positive correlation to a re-engagement in civil war. This would mean that 
investment in military is correlated with less durable peace.  
Discussion & Results 
After running the logistical regressions, the results suggest that countries which invested 
more greatly in health and education as percentages of GDP in periods of post-civil war peace 
were more likely to not see a breakdown of peace. Likewise, countries that invested more 
heavily in military expenditures as a portion of their GDP in post-civil war peacetime were more 




Table 1: Health, Education and Military Investment  
    Model 1           Model 2           Model 3              Model 4 
Timesince   -.099       -.188  -.172      -.118 
(.047)**      (.064)*   (.33)      (.229) 
 
Polity   -.016       -.000  -.000                    -.005 
  (.312)        (.08)*  (.065)*                (.042)** 
 
Real GDP per capita  -.000       -.000  -.000       -.000 
(.005)***       (.000)***  (.075)*      (.229) 
 
Health/GDP   ---       -.280    ---           --- 
     (.049)** 
 
Education/GDP  ---           ---  -.201           ---  
(.072)* 
 
Military/GDP   ---           ---    ---           .073  
                                                                                                                                (.007)** 
 
N    2368        791   993           1860 
 
χ 2    22.051      .0093  16.74           27.79 
Significance:  *=0.1   **=0.05  ***=0.01 
 
In the table above, one can observe the model’s negative relationship between all 
healthcare investment, education investment, country development and reengagement in civil 
war. This means that investment in healthcare and education improve peace durability of a 
nation. Likewise, there is positive relationship between military investment as a percentage of 
GDP and likelihood that a state will be reengaged in civil war. The results of analysis suggest 
that military investment is correlated with a lack of durable peace. The logistical regression 
model supports the hypothesis.  
The logistical regression models are run as independent models, not in one model with all 
variables included because that would limit the amount of observations too severely to observe 
meaningful correlations. However, when looking at Models 2 through 4 (Model 1 serves as the 
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base model), one can see the military investment has the greatest significance of the models (as 
noted by the symbol: *) which is found in Model 4. This can be for several reasons including the 
fact that military expenditures are often reported by states and the data is easily collected. There 
is also a large amount of observations for this model that help support the correlation between 
military investment and a lack of peace durability.  
Model 2 and 3 analyze the correlation between healthcare investment and peace 
durability and education investment and peace durability, respectively. While Model 2 has a 
higher significance level, this could be because when individuals are receiving the immediate 
medical care that they need, this helps them to understand the government as power that can 
govern and help its citizens. Previous studies show that even a 1% decrease in healthcare 
investment significantly increases the mortality across all metrics from infants to adults during 
peace time alone (Budhdeo, Watkins, Atun, Williams, Zeltner, & Maruthappu, 2015). Likewise, 
education has a lower significance however this does not necessarily mean that it less influential. 
Since education can have different value in different countries and the school systems are 
orchestrated differently, then monetary investment may have different results. Nonetheless, 
education is still seen to be correlated with peace durability as compared to military.  
In synthesis, the table above displays shows that an increased investment in military in 
post-civil war nations results in an increased likelihood of re-engaged civil war and therefore 
reduced durability of peace. This is displayed through Model 4. The previous two models, 
Models 2 and 3, show how increased investment in variables such as healthcare and education 
result in a decreased likelihood of civil war re-engagement and therefore increased post-civil war 
peace durability.  
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Qualitative Analysis: The Role of Military and Domestic Infrastructure in Peace Durability 
in Iraq 
The study of Iraq and its continued engagement in civil conflict underscores the necessity 
of peace durability research from both the quantitative and qualitative perspective. While the 
above quantitative analysis illuminates larger patterns and support for the hypothesis, the 
qualitative investigation is able to provide explanations and instances of how data points present 
themselves in real life. This type of analysis captures the story and narrative of civil war and 
those affected by it so that those narratives can be used to develop a more robust depiction of 
such interstate conflict. This, in turn, may be used to help the policy and legislation which 
dictates the dominate standard of recovery from civil war. In the case of Iraq, which is the 
country of focus for this qualitative analysis, it is notable that government underwent a unique 
set of circumstances and was subjected to a wide range of intense foreign influences that 
contributed to their initial instability. Beginning in 2003, the United States invaded Iraq under 
President George W. Bush after the 9/11 terrorist attack. However, it was not Bush’s decision 
alone. There was strong bipartisanship in congress, media and public approval for America’s 
entrance into Iraq (Hanson, 2013). After the U.S. entered, the heightened militaristic pressure 
effected a consolidation of terroristic forces, Jama’at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad (JTJ), ruled by Abu 
Musab al-Zarqawi, and Osama bin Laden’s already-established group, al-Qaeda. Together 
they formed Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). This union is speculated to have occurred because 
when the United States entered Iraq, it dismantled the Iraqi government. This was done 
through a process known as de-Ba’athification which formed a power vacuum and gave 
incentive for these groups to have a larger impact on the state. AQI was a Sunni militant  
group that was strongly opposed to the Shi’ite government which was being established 
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through American involvement. Weinberg (2014) argues that without the presence of U.S. 
these groups would not have had the ability to grow nor the strong motivations to act as 
violently in the short-term or long-term. The following section of this thesis begins with an 
overview of the different ethnic and religious groups in Iraq and the selection specific 
events which will be under analysis. Next, there will be a history of the Iraq War and the 
accompanying religious grievances as it relates to the rise of ISIL as well. This is followed 
by an analysis of peacetime investments, the subsequent rise of ISIL, reemergence of 
religious grievances again and current peacetime investments. The analysis illuminates how 
decisions regarding investment directly affect the health of the nation and opportunities for 
peace durability.  
Iraq has a long history of several different religions co-existing in the same location (see 
Figure 1, below). Currently, the population religious division of Iraq as reflected in the CIA 
World Fact Book is approximately 64-69% -Shia Muslim, Sunni- 29%-34% and approximately 
1%-4% of “other religions” (Central Intelligence Agency, 2019). These other religions include 
minorities such as Orthodox Christian, Catholic, Jewish and Yazidi. The major divide between 
the Sunnis and Shias in also reflected geographically in the below map (Holden, 2015). When 
discussing the sectarian differences between Shia and Sunni Muslims, it is important to note that 
this is the longest-standing divide in Islam’s history. This division can be traced back to days of 
Prophet Muhammad; more specifically his death in 632 C.E. Since the death of Prophet 
Muhammad, there has divide amongst Muslims regarding who should have been the rightful 
successor to the Prophet. This religious divide has, overtime, caused up risings in violence across 
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Iraq as different 
political leaders 
whom identified 
with a specific 
religious sect 
would quietly 
oppress the other 
sects with which 
he did not identify. 
Reflecting on the 
rule of Saddam 
Hussein, a Sunni 
leader in a Shi’ite-
majority country, he would use his authoritarian power to oppress the Shi’ites. Under the rules of 
Saddam, Shi’ites were often treated as second-class citizens and were denied access to political 
power.  Many of the grievances felt by Shi’ites and Sunnis will reemerge with the presence of 
ISIL.  
2003-2011: The Iraq War 
Shifting focus to the U.S involvement in Iraq, one of the first events that occurred with 
the onset of Western involvement in Iraq was the process of de-Ba’athification. This was led by 
the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) which was a transnational government of Iraq 
established by the United States. Paul Bremer, leader of the CPA became the formal leader of 





leadership, Iraq’s government was destabilized. The lack of government would dismantle the 
rule of harsh leader. However, the elimination of a harsh leader would also eliminate the Iraqi 
history during and sense of society that accompanied this harsh rule. Accordingly, during 
Hussein’s role as leader of Iraq, pledging allegiance to the Ba’ath party was an unspoken, but 
present pre-requisite to acquiring jobs with livable wages and access to political and civic life. 
De-Ba’athification dismissed all individuals belonging to the Ba’ath party from their jobs. The 
intent of this process was to rid Iraq of the Ba’ath party’s influence because the Ba’ath party was 
seen as extension of Saddam Hussein’s unethical and undemocratic rule. From inside of Iraq the 
effects of de-Ba’athification were much more intense than its possibly innocent intentions. It 
resulted in an unsurmountable and growing number of unemployed individuals and frustrations 
with both the Iraqi and American government (Sissons & Al-Saiedi, 2013). Sissons & Al-Saiedi 
(2013) detail in their report that according to the International Center for Transnational Justice 
between 2003 and 2006, the CPA dismissed thousands of individuals in the education, 
healthcare, and other technical and cultural services industries because of their affiliations with 
the Ba’ath party. Specifically, Iraq’s Ministry of Education was most severely affected because 
the Ba’ath party distributed its propaganda via classroom education much like any other 
government. In the eyes of the CPA, this was immediate grounds for elimination and rebuilding 
of the network of educational institutions as a while. The results of de-Ba’athification in the 
Ministry of Education were approximately 17,000 dismissals by January 2005 without due 
process (Sissons & Al-Saiedi, 2013). Not only was unemployment frustrating to the citizens, but 
from the governmental perspective, there was now a complete lack of infrastructure as there 
were no individuals to operate the various institutions such as education and healthcare. 
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 In many ways, it could be seen that the process of de-Ba’athification was felt more 
severely by Sunni Muslims. As part of Saddam’s leadership, being part of the Ba’ath party also 
meant that you identified as Sunni. The result is that  a disproportionate number of Sunnis in 
comparison to Shi’ites were the ones who were released of jobs and livelihood. Iraq, as an entire 
state, felt the effects of these crass actions, however it was Sunni Muslims who incurred the 
largest gross reduction of power. Now, the minority who had held the majority power were 
powerless, and the majority who had felt powerless were on an even playing field. This caused 
grievances to emerge for Sunni and Shi’ites alike. However, the lack of presence of the Sunni 
controlled government allowed for the structural opportunity for the entrenched grievances of the 
Shi’ites to rise again. As referenced in the literature review, these grievances can attribute to the 
rise of civil war (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004).  
Due to the widespread nature of the Ba’ath party and the subsequent vetting, there was a 
complete downfall of the state (Dozier, 2016). The vetting process which removed all members 
of the Ba’ath party from their job or position was enacted without the proper civil support in 
place leaving the Iraqis people feeling angered and frustrated. A report published in Al-Jazeera 
in 2008 shows the true severity of the de-Ba’athification law and lingering frustrations and 
effects it had on its citizens. It not only cites various local articles discussing their frustrations, 
but it forwardly addresses the obvious criticisms this process received in Iraq such as: 
[…the CPA, de-Ba’athification law, and the constitution are] under accusations of abuse 
of this law "for the favor of the Shia parties" and it came as a result of the nature the 
"Iranian-American Relations" which were "highly coordinated" in that period.]                         
 ) .(Al-Jazeera], 2008] الجزيرة 
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This excerpt shows that way that the forced dismissals undermined Iraq’s government for a 
protracted period and lead to a sense of grievance among all those effected while also having a 
strong effect on the religious power struggles within Iraq (Sissons & Al-Saiedi, 2013). Yet, after 
Saddam Hussein’s downfall, much of Iraq indiscriminately went without basic services such as 
water and electricity (Dozier, 2016). This was followed by a militaristic impact as the Iraqi 
military and security forces were disbanded. The second element of the CPA-instituted de-
Ba’athification law was enacted immediately after and included the appointment and hiring of 
385,000 armed forces, 285,000 of the Interior Ministry (police), and 50,000 in the presidential 
security unites (Pfiffner, 2010).  
A proper account of America’s involvement in Iraq could not be genuinely complete 
without addressing the heinous instances and impact of torture such as those at Abu Ghraib 
Prison. The actions that occurred at Abu Ghraib prison were instances of torture caused by a 
slew of psychological effects relating to obedience and group think. The situation resulted in 
human right violations against prisoners of the Abu Ghraib Prison in Iraq by the U.S. Army and 
Central Intelligence Agency. The atrocities included physical abuse, sexual abuse, rape, sodomy, 
torture and murder. These violations became widespread public news and further deteriorated the 
relationship between Iraq and American involvement and bolstered the desire for American 
troops to leave (Sullivan, 2008). These events are essential to mention because they contribute to 
the grievances felt by the Iraqi individuals while heightening the need for not only an Iraqi 
military, but also an Iraqi government prepared to protect its people. Despite America’s attempt 
to squash terrorism and the authoritarian rule of Hussein, VNSAs continued to rise to power 
quietly. Although U.S. troops were able to temporarily disband JTJ through the death of their 
leader al-Zarqawi in 2006 (COD: U.S. airstrike), the successors rebranded and continued to 
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change its title to various temporary names. Years later, the world would come to know this 
group as the IS/ISIS/ISIL/Daesh.  
 Overall, from inside Iraq, the entirety of the Iraq War painted a picture of skepticism, 
bloodshed, and inadequacy regarding U.S. capabilities to establish a peaceful, democratic society 
abroad. But, from the American perspective at this time, the primary goals of the 2003 
invasion, the defeat al-Qaeda and replacement of Saddam Hussein’s corruption with 
democracy, had been accomplished. The de-Ba’athification process was working insofar that the 
Iraqi government of Saddam Hussein was entirely eradicated. The domestic infrastructure in this 
case was simply collateral damage. 
After a troop surge and a climbing death toll of 4,000 American soldiers, the American 
public disapproval hit an all-time low (Cable News Network, 2018). President Barak Obama was 
forced to begin withdrawing troops in 2009. The invasion of Iraq incurred unforeseen costs and 
losses of American troops (IRIN, 2012). The initial 70% of the public that supported U.S. 
involvement now yearned for withdrawal (Hanson, 2013). The new Iraqi leadership would soon 
be able to make independent investment decisions to rebuild the domestic infrastructure and 
repair the grievances felt by both the Sunni and the Shi’ite groups. Yet, the original interim 
government lead by Paul Bremer was no longer in power and there is a new Shi’ite President of 
Iraq as of 2006, Jalal Talabani. This provides opportunity for a new era of strategic decision 




 Peacetime investment following the Iraq War is a representation of the primary concerns 













bodies perceived understanding of the people’s needs (Kregel, 1994). In Figure 2 above, within 
the dashed box which indicates the period of peacetime, there is a clear increase in military 
investment and no other intense investments in education and military. This figure represents 
Iraq’s investment in healthcare and military investment at high level to provide the opportunity 
to see how it correlates with different period of civil peace or conflict. In Figure 2 (and later 
Figure 3), education expenditure is not accounted for due to a quota which keeps the percentage 
of investment equal across the time period evaluated (Index Mundi, 2015). From the data 
available, certainly, one perspective suggests that a leader may be inclined to think that military 









































however this thesis’s rational explains an alternative perspective (Herman, 2015). When a 
country invests heavily in militaristic forces during peacetime, this increases the possibility of 
destabilization in the country because the militaristic forces are not able to address the grievances 
which caused the civil war initially. Thus, there is an expectation that those grievances will arise 
once more and cause the country to re-engage in civil war. In this instance, the Iraq War is 
followed by the rise of ISIL.  
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL): 2014-Present  
 Looking specifically at the events that happened in Iraq during the early 2000’s, such as 
the rise of different VNSAs, there are several instances of large changes in budgetary investment. 
These differences in investment, although sometimes disguised, had unique effects on the 
country. The ebbs and flows in investment at crucial times during Iraq’s attempt to stabilize 
contributed to Iraq’s lack of peace durability time and time again. Considering the above 
peacetime investments by the new Shi’ite Iraqi president, it is not shocking that there was the 
rise of ISIL, a Sunni militant and extremist group, with such strong grievances. In many ways, 
Sunnis across Iraq felt a lack of power as de-Ba’athification was recently instituted and there was 
the appointed leadership of new Shi’ite leader where Sunnis had held all the power before 
(Global Policy Forum, 2019). Thus, the pouring in of military investment in peacetime when the 
lack of domestic infrastructure in Iraq (from de-Ba’athification) demanded the provision of 
social services such as healthcare through domestic infrastructure investment resulted in rise of 
grievances which may inspire civil war (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004). The following paragraphs 
investigate this further.   
Tracking the military investment and health investment in the peacetime years of 2011 
and 2012, there a general is a drop in both. When pairing this with knowledge about the ways 
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that increased domestic infrastructure will help to repair the grievances by meeting the necessary 
basic needs of individuals, perhaps there was not enough investment by the leadership. The small 
percentages invested during peacetime were not great enough to begin repairing the domestic 
infrastructure which was barely existing after de-Ba’athification and eight years of war. 
Additionally, the aforementioned Al-Qaeda leader was captured and the individual that lead 
Islamic State of Iraq (which would later become ISIL), Abu Ayyub al-Masri, died in a U.S.-
Iraqi operation and the organization was transitioning to Abu Bakr al -Baghdadi as the 
leader. ISIL remained relatively undetectable until it gained traction during the Syrian 
war in 2013, although their grievances and Sunni-focused goals long preceded the 
foundation group. Immediately prior to ISIL rising as a prominent VNSA, the graph 
above reveals the spike in military expenditures while education and healthcare see a less 
dramatic involvement. While the government was not able provide the necessary social 
services due to the investment in military, this provided ISIL the opportunity to recruit. 
ISIL was able to provide social services not provided by the government, like many 
VNSAs do, and grow in strength and numbers (Kydd & Walter, 2006). Since there is such 
a strong increase in military investment which is met in significantly less proportions to 
investment in domestic infrastructure, the hypothesis may predict less durability of peace 
especially with the presence of ISIL. As the rational section mentioned, the lack of 
investment in domestic infrastructure does not help to reaffirm the confidence of the 
individuals in a war-torn state of the capabilities of their government if individuals are 
continuing to need to live without a sufficient education or healthcare system (Budhdeo 
et al., 2015). 
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 Understanding how the Iraqi War impacts ISIL’s reign can be increasingly complicated. 
Although this time period is within the boundaries of the Iraq War, many of the events 
contributed significantly to the development of ISIL and the ways that the peacetime monetary 
investments were not able to satisfy the grievances of the different sects. With Iraq’s city center 
in shambles as the de-Ba’athification process wreaked havoc on social instructions and domestic 
infrastructure, American forces were hunting down Osama bin Laden and using force to do so. In 
2006, despite the drop in military investment, as seen in the above graph, according to many 
news sources, there was a strong wave of sectarian violence that took the lives of nearly 1000 
individuals. Waves of sectarian violence that continue to surface throughout the war provide the 
grounds that the violence in Iraq was still being influenced by sectarian disputes.  
Perhaps the most well-known accomplishments that occurred during the Iraq War is in 
2011 when United States Navy SEALs, SEAL Team Six’s executed Osama bin Laden. Bin 
Laden was the founder and first leader of the Islamist extremist group, al-Qaeda. Al-Qaeda was 
the group responsible for the 9/11 attacks on the Twin Towers and an impetus for entry into Iraq. 
The war that was dubbed “the War on Terror” had seemingly accomplished its goal. So why then 
did Iraq struggle with forming a cohesive government after 2011, the end of the Iraq War? A 
look into the rise of sectarian grievances and power vacuums during peacetime offers a valuable 
explanation.   
The impact of the capture of Osama bin Laden should also be considered in critical light. 
While the overall political security may be augmented, the immediate affects for everyday 
citizen may be less positive. Like many religious and secular organizations, what al-Qaeda (and 
ISIL) can offer is physical safety and public services for themselves and their families in a time 
when the government cannot. In some cases, they also offer personal recognition, leadership 
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roles and monetary stability. This directly mirrors basic psychological needs of humans that, in 
the presence of an unstable government, are not being met. Additionally, since most terrorist 
organizations and members of the organizations believe they are not causing terror but are rather 
carrying out acts of loyalty to god or political justice, they become a shelter for these individuals 
surrounded by war and violence (European Institute of Peace, 2018). The period immediately 
following the dismantling of al-Qaeda was seen as a huge success for the United States and the 
many American citizens interpreted it as the beginning of the end. In reality, what was the 
beginning of the end for many Americans was the beginning of another beginning  for Iraqis. 
The process of de-Ba’athification had dismantled one government and forced a new one to begin 
with not prior infrastructure. This was dangerous because the government was not equipped and 
unable to provide Iraqi citizens with domestic infrastructure to feel secure and equal in their own 
state, therefore allowing another power vacuum to potentially rise again. This is evidenced by the 
continuous attacks on minority groups that began during peacetime (IRIN, 2011). These 
grievances against minority and majority continues to develop across Iraq. On in particular group 
that carried out attacks and came to power is known as ISIL.   
ISIL rises to power in 2013-2014. During this time, acts of terrorism are increasing 
throughout Iraq. They occupy largely the north of Iraq and Kurdistan where they carry out 
merciless acts of genocide again Shi’ite Muslims and Yazidis, a minority religious group located 
primarily in the north of Iraq and Kurdistan. The military investment continues to rise, reaching 
5.3% in 2015 and the healthcare investment climbs to 3.3% in 2015 (Stockholm International 
Peace Research Institute, 2017) (World Bank, 2018). These numbers are radically different from 
years prior where health and military investment moved in equal parts. The explanation for this 
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shift in focus is most likely explained by the new Sunni president, Fuad Masum, who took office 
in 2014 (Timelines of History, 2018). 
2016-2018 brought about difficult times in Iraq. This could be explained through the shift 
in focus of priorities away from domestic infrastructure, to even more intensely on military force 
as indicated in the figure to the below. Education is not included as a measurement of domestic 
infrastructure due 
to a quota which 
held constant the 
percentage of 
investment (Index 
Mundi, 2015) The 
domestic 
infrastructure data 
able to be 
collected on Iraq 
in years 2016 and 
forward is spotty at best due to the rise of ISIL and data from these years still being currently 
reported and backfilled. However, there is a continued increase in military investment, as 
compared to historic averages. While ISIL forces have retreated, they are most prominent in the 
northern Iraq, Kurdistan, and northern Syria according to a New York Times article and actively 
recruiting by offering individuals social services that the government is not providing such as 
healthcare and education (Callimachi, 2018). The article affirms the assertion that ISIL is less 









































discussed in thesis, there is reason to believe that less ISIL forces will not necessarily correlate to 
increased peace durability. Rather, the peace durability will be dependent upon the governments 
investment strategies which address both the grievances of the nation and the necessity for a 
security apparatus in tandem.  The decision to invest, where to invest, and how much will 
determine the success of the peace for years to come.  
Discussion 
 Iraq’s experience with civil war is unique, but it is important to understand that each 
country will present investment in military and domestic infrastructure in varying ways. In the 
specific case above, the military investment as a part of GDP had to be weighed with the 
presence of American forces. Considering the amount of investment that was given by the Iraqi 
government in combination with the military force provided by the American government, the 
military presence and influence was in fact much more intense than any numeric value could 
have revealed. Yet, the investment in domestic infrastructure regarding education was 
immeasurable since it had been at a fixed rate for many years. Still, the insight from the data 
available in the logit models can give new perspectives to the war and how these two variables 
interact.  
 For Iraq, although the military expenditure percentages had to be taken in account with 
the presence of foreign military aid and the education variable was fixed, there are still 
meaningful insights knowing the correlation between peace durability is highly correlated with 
an increase in domestic infrastructure. Other countries may present their investment in military 
or domestic infrastructure in more traditional ways and the data may be more complete, however 
it is important to work with data that is less than ideal since real-world application of this thesis 
involves understanding partial data in complex circumstances. However, as mentioned in the 
 
48 
results & discussion section, many times the information that is needed to conclusively draw an 
empirical correlation is not available due to the condition of the country or the unwillingness of a 
country to release data. Therefore, reflecting on the history of a country also allows one to fill in 
the gaps that are not available numerically.  
 Another important aspect of integrating numerical values and correlations into 
explanations is to understand the true representation of the data as well as capture elements, such 
as the general morale of the individuals, which are sometimes undetectable when evaluating 
solely statistical values. Additionally, pairing the historical reflection with the data illuminates 
some of the surprising numbers that may be present and can help to understand nuances and 
changes. For example, in Iraq there was an unexpected decrease in military and health 
expenditures once bin Laden was captured (World Bank, 2018). Yet there was increase in both 
types of expenditures occurred once the Iraq War ended and was in peacetime (World Bank, 
2018). Understanding the recruitment tactics of ISIL as well as which grievances drive civil war 
can aid in understanding how ISIL was able to provide resources which assisted ISIL’s rise and 
temporary control of land (European Institute of Peace, 2018). Once data is paired with this 
information, it becomes possible to speculate that during time of increased peace, a government 
should be hesitant to discontinue providing domestic infrastructure support in any capacity 
otherwise there is the potential for another group or side to step in and gain power especially in 
areas where there are historical grievances. This is one possible explanation of the events in Iraq 
during this time period.  
 Considering the overall trends in both Iraq and the fluctuating violent outbreaks, this 
violence is due in part to re-emerging grievances. Reflecting on the literature review and 
rationale, there is the notion that these grievances can be helped in part by augmenting the 
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domestic infrastructure and ensuring that each party has the necessary basic care they need in 
order to live life. This includes, but is not limited to, education, healthcare as well as 
employment or means of coming together as a community.  
Application: Iraq’s Policy Brief 
The previous quantitative investigation and qualitative analysis illuminate the ways in 
which domestic infrastructure supports peace durability as explained in the rationale. Once this 
information is established, it is essential to understand the global implications of this knowledge 
and how it can aid in peace building. The following policy brief will evaluate the ways that Iraq 
can alter their strategic leadership decisions to create strong peace durability with less structural 
opportunities for civil war reoccurrence. Beginning with the current situation and structural 
opportunities for civil war, the discussion will then transition into the real constraints the nation 
may face when instituting this strategic approach. Immediately following will be a discussion of 
what types of policy may be implemented which is then concluded with an overview of global 
implications of such a potential shift in policy.  
Background & Status Quo 
Many individuals within the United States shy away from considering the events of the Iraq 
War a true civil conflict, although this term most accurately describes the situation. Beginning in 
2003, when the Bush administration decided to enter Iraq with espoused intent of eliminating the 
dictatorial rule of Saddam Hussein and the Ba’athist party, the United States was entering a 
country with a citizenry that possessed religious cleavages and long-standing grievances. The 
violence that reemerged and the sectarian grievances felt were of those individuals who were 
oppressed by others (Lipka, 2014). Thus, perhaps there is an imperative that the state of Iraq has 
a stronger hand in repairing its social cleavages. Any increased military involvement, rather than 
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power-sharing discussion from the United State or foreign states, continued to prolong, not 
hasten, the end of the civil war (Fearon, 2007).  While this was not publicized on American 
media, that should not diminish the existence of such variables. Saddam Hussein and the Ba’ath 
party, both affiliated with Sunni Islam, continued the marginalization of the minority Shi’ite 
Muslims in Iraq. While there was the presence of this civil grievance, the Bush administration 
and many others supporting U.S. involvement preferred the term “sectarian violence” instead of 
civil war. However, sectarian violence does not accurately account for all the events and 
motivations of this armed conflict. The Iraq War was a civil conflict despite American 
involvement not only because it meets the definition of 25 battle-related deaths within a country, 
the same threshold which was used in the Quantitative Investigation, but because the violence 
emerged amongst the country’s groups of citizens.  
What is often dubbed, “The fight against ISIS” is, too, considered a civil conflict in the 
context of this thesis. After the withdrawal of American troops from Iraq in 2011, there was a 
rise in the strength of the extremist group. The extremist group took advantage of the structural 
incapacity of the state to act as a government independently. This is a common occurrence that 
when there is a lack of physical security that typically mitigate violence. The tension along the 
Sunni-Shi’ite minority axis was then able to re-emerge causing a re-occurrence of a long string 
of civil wars. The following portion of this policy brief will identify the underlying and 
publicized grievances within Iraq as well as Western misconceptions about the wars. After a 
discussion of US involvement from 2003 and 2017 in Iraq there will be a realistic overview of 
the current state of Iraq, a potential policy recommendation to reduce the likelihood of another 
civil conflict recurrence, and strategic decision-making process.  
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The rule of Saddam Hussein, often perceived as a dictatorship, was one of the U.S.’s 
espoused reasonings for entering into Iraq and dismantling the Ba’ath party. Additionally, the 
rule of this Ba’ath party, as mentioned in the qualitative analysis, was detrimental to the 
representation and political health of the state. In 2003, after the entrance of the United States 
and the subsequent fall of Saddam Hussein and the Ba’ath party, Iraq’s capital erupted into a 
frenzy of looting and lawlessness. While the Iraq’s political future hung in the balance, re-
establishing order would become the most arduous task of those controlling forces in the capital. 
Due to the economy that was already in shambles due to Saddam Hussein’s rule, rebuilding and 
re-institutionalizing Iraq became extremely difficult. Furthermore, the task of rebuilding Iraq was 
assigned to individuals such as Paul Bremmer, who have now admitted their unpreparedness to 
take on such a role (Martin, 2013).  
During this disordered time following the fall of Hussein, many Shi’ite Muslims, a 
minority in Iraq who were brutalized by the rule of the Sunni dictator, were finding a renewed 
sense of freedom among the chaotic Iraqi state. The chaos and lack of leadership in Iraq was 
evident as several different governments emerged including the Interim Iraqi government, 
Transitional Iraqi government, and the appointed new, permanent Iraqi government. During the 
appointments of these three distinct governments, there was a continuous investment into 
military spending. However, the disordered nature of the state and the historical marginalization 
of non-Shi’ite groups meant that there was extensive need for domestic infrastructure reform, 
especially healthcare services (World Health Organization, 2019). Based upon expenditure data 
in Figure 2 and Figure 3 as discussed in the qualitative section, these underlying grievances were 
not being met. It is clearly shown how the monetary investment of these governments was 
designated largely toward military investment. This decision was made most likely because 
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strategic leadership post-civil war, as discussed in the rationale, is often inclined to favor military 
investment since it will temporarily mitigate violence. However, when the U.S. withdrew troops 
in 2011, a large source of the physical security which was suppressing the violence was removed 
(Brunner, 2018). Thus, the combined lack of domestic infrastructure and quick removal of 
military forces created structural opportunities for extremist groups to thrive. This eventually 
leads into the rise and presence of ISIL in Iraq during 2014-2017 which had developed into the 
conquest of major northern cities including Fallujah, Mosul and Tikrit. Throughout these times, 
the Iraqi government was forced to make decisions regarding the investment of the GDP into 
military or domestic-infrastructure related goods and services. As military investment increased 
as did the again-suppressed Sunni-Shia tensions. 
ISIL gained territory by taking advantage of the civil tensions that had re-emerged 
because of the historical religious reinforcing cleavages. The results of this long-standing 
division can be seen referenced in Figure 1. Accordingly, U.S. troops were sent back in to defeat 
the extremist group that was a threat to the rest of humanity. However, on December 10, 2017, 
the Iraqi Prime Minister was able to announce that ISIL had been defeated from Iraq. This 
celebration marked the end of an extremist group’s presence the beginning of re-focusing on the 
religious cleavage that had been masked by the media-encompassing VNSA’s occupying the 
Iraqi region.  
As Nadim Shehadi of Chatham House mentions that many Western countries may have 
focused too largely on the influence of VNSAs such as ISIL and failed to recognize the intense 
discontentment and marginalization of the Sunni constituency (Grillot & Davenport, 2017). It is 
not a coincidence that the presence of underlying grievances caused the rise of civil war 
especially without dictatorship Hussein. Referring to the anocracy hypothesis, as discussed in the 
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beginning the of quantitative investigation, the removal of the dictatorship in the absence of 
Hussein’s harsh leadership and an un-established democracy, there was an increased likelihood 
of civil war. When referencing the Polity Score database, this change in democracy is clear as the 
polity score -9 (signaling autocracy) before the entrance of the U.S. to a +3, (signaling 
democracy) once the United States exited (Systematic Peace, 2018). Accordingly, there was a 
power vacuum that occurred because of the civil unrest and the inability of the new and chaotic 
government to satisfy the long-standing grievances of the not only the marginalized, but all those 
who were victimized under the dictatorship of Saddam Hussein. The power vacuum allowed for 
non-state actors, such as ISIL, to gain traction since they can satisfy grievances the government 
cannot. Remembering the proposed reasoning in the rationale that civil violence in spurred by 
grievances, when the government is unable to provide these domestic goods and services because 
of the nation’s choice to invest in military, like Iraq, then individuals may align their allegiances 
with such violent non-state actors (European Institute of Peace, 2018).  
 Iraq’s current condition, from a domestic infrastructure and military standpoint, includes 
a more intense investment in favor of military as displayed in Figure 1.2. Since the United States 
invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom, there has been a 
consistent and incremental increase in military investment. This was due to wide-ranging factors 
including the rise of several different VNSAs as well as extensive foreign involvement by the 
American government. However, the continuous allocation of money in amounts far 
outweighing those that support domestic infrastructure, although logical and warranted by the 
Iraqi governments is what most likely what enabled a continuous break down of durable peace 
although there were instances in which there was reduced violence.  Accompanying the 
increased investment in military was a lower amount of domestic infrastructure investment. This 
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translates to less quality, and therefore, accessibility to both healthcare and education. For many 
countries, especially a country like Iraq which once had a functioning and admirable healthcare 
and education system, not having one can be devastating. The lack of healthcare can impact 
people’s trust and confidence in the government as a capable governing institution (Shore, 2007). 
In the realm of education, not having a system in place to educate children can affect the morale 
of parents as well as the overall growth and development of Iraq’s future adults for the rest of 
their lives. This means that the talent within Iraq and future of Iraq’s citizenry to be equipped 
with conflict-resolution skills dramatically decreases. As Iraq’s government continues to restore 
itself after the 2003 American invasion and de-Ba’athification, it becomes essential that the 
government is able to act as a government by providing individuals with basic needs such as 
healthcare and education. A restoration of the domestic infrastructure would be transformational 
for the lives of the Iraqi citizens and the government. A restoration of domestic infrastructure 
would allow the government to begin to smooth over long-term and entrenched sectarian 
grievances held by the different sects of the Iraqi population. 
Recommendation 
 After the consideration of Iraq’s past tension between the Sunni majority and Shi’ite 
minority, the removal of physical security there is the increased opportunity for violence, 
especially without a long-established, democratic government. Increasing support for domestic 
infrastructure and decreasing the portion of money which is currently allocated to military 
investments would have multiple benefits for Iraq as a whole. If the Iraq government is able to 
invest in itself and make this decision without the assistance or consultation of a foreign country, 
this could help to restore a sense of Iraqi nationalistic pride which was largely stripped away 
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with de-Ba’athification. Additionally, Iraq’s investment would allow citizens to regain faith in 
the government’s ability to operate and overcome power vacuums. 
  A restoration of Iraqi nationalistic pride would assist the government’s ability to function 
and pass policy because of increasing support. This would not only help Iraq internally, but it 
would allow the country to evolve away from being stereotyped as a war-torn country in need of 
intervention from other countries. Therefore, the investment in domestic infrastructure does not 
only assist the citizens, but it also helps the government itself evolve and overcome large barriers 
as it moves away from its long-held stereotypes.  
 As Iraq continues to invest in domestic infrastructure, overtime, the consistent investment 
should improve the quality of life of Iraqis throughout the country (Islam & Clarke, 2002). 
Accordingly, there would be a renewed sense of faith in the government. This sense of reliability 
will help the government further on the international stage as there is an accountability of Iraq to 
its citizens and it is viewed as independent country. With the continued foreign involvement in 
order to assist Iraq in being released form the grip of ISIL, the public perception has been shaped 
around the knowledge that Iraq is a country requiring continued assistance in order to return to a 
state of stability. Thus, maintain this stability, as done through a monetary renewal of domestic 
infrastructure would establish this faith in the government in its ability to consider voices and 
meet the needs of the citizens.   
As referenced in the rationale and supported in the quantitative investigation, there is 
undoubtedly a call to increase the amount of domestic infrastructure investment in the current 
Iraqi government. The result of this increase is a predicted reduction of violence and better peace 
durability. Considering the recent fall of ISIL and the continued withdrawal of troops, Iraq is 
positioned to be at risk for a civil war reoccurrence once again (Marta, 2002). The withdrawal of 
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physical security, in particular, escalates the opportunity for violence to break out again as 
Sunni-Shia tensions rise again. Thus, as grievances are renewed, investing in education and 
healthcare could help to alleviate these tensions as individuals feel as though their needs are 
being met.  
Education would be instrumental in the rebuilding process since previous literature 
suggests that education can be a unique way to institute conflict-resolution practices (Abu Nimer 
& Nasser, 2017). In the same way that specialized curricula were found to be helpful for students 
and teachers in the past, this tactic could be used to bolster civil society in Iraq. This plan would 
require not only intense investment monetarily, but also in time and human power to devise and 
implement the plans. Furthermore, ensuring that there are physical structures for children to 
attend school and receive this education should be a primary consideration, even preceding the 
development of conflict-resolution action plans. Having a reliable education system is also a 
long-term investment since the education system is a way to teach children, and tangentially 
families, about political changes and active citizenship.  
Considering the ways in which physical security suppresses small out breaks in the short-
term, but domestic infrastructure provides resolution of the root grievances in the long-term, it is 
important to strike a balance in both. Pertaining directly to the strategic leadership, this means 
conducting democratic elections to prevent the rise of dictatorship and to restore faith in the 
community about the legitimacy of the elections. Furthermore, since Shi’ite Muslims have been 
banned from political involvement through previous de facto regulations of Saddam Hussein and 
Sunni Muslims stripped of their power through de-Ba’athification, it is essential that their voices 
and concerns are heard. This type of justice being restored to an oppressed group will help to 
establish peace durability through the elimination of grievances.  
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Domestic & International Constraints 
An evaluation of Iraq’s past and current state poses specific constraints, as mentioned 
above, which require special strategizing. These constraints are largely temporally related. 
Considering domestic constraints, there are factors such the length of time required to establish a 
democracy and the lag time considered when implementation of any new policy. Furthermore, 
transitioning to a democracy can be a dangerous and volatile time for a country as there is an 
uprising of voices, opinions and grievances that must be accommodated by a government 
(Mansfield & Snyder,1995). Additionally, when entering a democratic state, there are many 
individuals who may not be aware of their stand in accordance to their political affiliations 
(Mansfield & Snyder,1995). On the international scale, there is the fear of the spillover effect 
which is primarily concerned with economic rehabilitation, as well as surrounding VNSA 
violence (Pham & Doucouliagos, 2017). 
 The first consideration is the domestic constraints: the length of time required to establish 
a democracy and the lag time in implementing new policy. Based upon the literature review and 
the quantitative investigation, it is clear that both the establishment of democracy as well as 
domestic infrastructure related policy are vital in the establishment of durable peace (Windsor, 
2003). Since Iraq is formally no longer engaged in civil war, having the citizenry understand that 
they are part of democracy would help to ensure durable peace since different factions have the 
capability to voice their needs. However, the assurance that an established political system works 
as a democracy is  gained over time. Surely, upholding the most amount of transparency possible 
in elections may help to increase the sense of an established democracy. 
 The second domestic constraint is the lag time in implementing new policy. When the 
budget is expanded for both education and healthcare, there will be a delay in the amount of time 
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that the monetary expansion will have time to truly affect the current condition of citizens. For 
example, while the budget for education allows for a new vision of the education program and 
new resources to be distributed, this process does not occur instantaneously. The time between 
the civil war ending and the new curriculum to be implemented, is extremely unstable. In this 
time, there is no promise that the needs are being heard by the government and there are still 
grievances that are being renewed.  
On the international scale, a potential drawback to the investment in domestic 
infrastructure and economic rehabilitation is the spillover effect. This is defined as the economic 
effects on bilateral trade due to terrorist attacks in neighboring countries (Pham & Doucouliagos, 
2017). A sample of 160 countries from 1976 until 2014 showed that there was a reduction in 
$6.4 million for each additional terrorist attack (Pham & Doucouliagos, 2017). Therefore, as the 
economic capabilities of the government are limited by the presence of terrorism in neighboring 
countries, then the capacity of the government to ensure that there is as little possible structural 
opportunity for the terrorism to expand into that country is also reduced. Thus, in order to 
combat these potential losses, there must be a budget that is prepared to take on these hits. Yet, 
given the economic disaster left behind by Saddam Hussein and the de-Ba’athification brought 
about by the involvement of American government, there are challenges in preparing for these 
losses in bilateral trade considering the presence of ISIL in neighboring Syria. In this case, 
international organizations and relief funds may be able to help Iraq financially as they attempt 
to restabilize and promote peace in the Middle East. Additionally, these types of organizations 
may be able to assist by attempting to reduce the amount of terrorism in neighboring countries as 
a larger orchestrated effort to establish peace. This would reduce the amount of pressure on Iraq 
to deal with the surrounding circumstances independently, especially knowing that terrorism in 
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neighboring countries can affect bilateral trade and therefore the economic well-being of the 
country.  
There are certainly drawbacks and true challenges to implementing a policy in favor of 
domestic infrastructure support although there are many benefits. Therefore, considering these 
drawbacks in advance of budgetary spending will allow for strategic planning that is more 
equipped to handle potential decreases in monetary investment. Overcoming these barriers will 
be an essential part to not only ensuring the peace durability of Iraq, but the long-term health of 
the nation and its ability to deal with surrounding violence. 
Global Implications 
 Iraq’s successfully transition through the end of ISIL into a stable democratic state 
through long-term and more qual investment in military and domestic infrastructure would be 
instrumental in shaping future policy. The above quantitative and qualitative explorations 
explore that domestic infrastructure investment is not only the best solution, but an attainable 
one. Seeing Iraq establish peace durability through a balance of military and domestic 
infrastructure investment to address long-term grievances would be revolutionary for post-civil 
war peace building. Additionally, the it would reframe the way that many non-profit 
organizations provide aid to countries in need with the understanding that the time following the 
end of civil war is also as important as during the war itself. Lastly, this could also reduce the 
potentiality for terrorist organizations to take advantage of the structural opportunities for power 
exploitation that are posed by civil war.  
Conclusion 
 In all, the aim of this thesis was to establish that investment in domestic infrastructure in 
greater or equal parts to investment in military post civil-war leads to greater likelihood of peace 
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durability. In the quantitative portion, the regression models showed a clear correlation between 
an increased likelihood of peace durability when there was an investment in healthcare and 
education while there was a decreased likelihood of peace durability when there was an 
investment in military. This type of high-level analysis helps to establish the need for further 
investigation into the status quo and to look at cases in which this type of explanation may be 
suitable. A look at Iraq from 2003 to present sheds light on the ways in which this thesis may be 
applied to a country today. While Iraq was not the most idyllic case, it is important to understand 
the world exists exterior of a spherical vacuum so external and unprecedented influences must be 
considered. After looking at Iraq and the comprehensive grievances that accompanied the civil 
war and violence, it was clear that the long-standing sectarian violence was a prominent 
grievance that needed to be considered to ever find durability within the nation.   
 The discussion of grievances and the way they interact is a cornerstone as the thesis 
transitions into the policy brief component. Not only is the above research valuable to 
international affairs scholarship, but it may also be used to form policy that will lead to stronger 
agreements which facilitate durable peace within and among countries (Fortna, 2003). Equipped 
with an understanding that the civil war is driven by specific grievances, the policy brief is able 
to address not how to stop violence, but how to move toward and absence of grievances in order 
to create a peaceful society. Based off literature, it is clear that education and health investment 
are potentials for beginning to shape a society founded on durable peace (Abu-Nimer & Nassar, 
2017; Windsor, 2003). However, many of the programs which would allow for an increased 
sense of domestic infrastructure, such as education reform and increased economic strength 
through trade are vulnerable to drawbacks (United States Government Accountability Office, 
2007). These drawbacks include the difficulty of implementing education reform because of 
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unique regional needs in Iraq and the reluctance of countries to increase bilateral trade with post-
civil war countries. (Abu-Nimer, & Nassar, 2017; Vreeland, 2008). These drawbacks have the 
opportunity to be sidestepped through looking to international organization and neighboring state 
to provide support as the country regains independence.  While this is not the best-case scenario, 
the recognition that this thesis has realistic goals that are able to be achieved is an important part 
of the purpose of the thesis overall.  
 This discussion of how a civil war state may establish peace in our word today also has a 
more humanitarian purpose. By discovering the narrative that has been told about civil war states 
which is that civil war often produces fragile states that reengage in civil war and then using a 
qualitative approach to reveal information brings new opportunities to individuals of these states. 
Rather than assuming that a state is unable to achieve to peace other than through preventing the 
engagement of war, my research showed that by fostering the absence of grievances, there is a 
more humane approach to preventing violent outbreak. By addressing which specific grievances 
motivates individuals to go to war, then one is able to address those grievances through the 
specific approach as required by the unique set of people. This changes the standard of what is 
expected of states who are exiting civil war. The narrative is no longer that these states are 
unable to achieve peace, it is that the grievances of the people have historically not been 
addressed. This shifts the responsibility of the state from being the war stopper, to the grievance 
amender. The government is entity responsible to its people for providing them with their basic 
needs and assuring their minimum quality of life to a level such that there are other viable 
solutions to their expression other than war.  
 As peace studies continues to expand and become a more dynamic and interdisciplinary 
field, there is a need for scholarship and research to continue in the realm of the execution of 
 
62 
theories This translates to answering the question “how?” at a deeper level. For example, in the 
case of this thesis, how will states be able to measure and collect information on the grievances 
of their citizens? How will states be held responsible if they are not listening to their citizens? 
Additionally, there is more scholarship to be developed in the discipline of justice studies. For 
example, addressing if negligence of a state to address the grievances of the individuals is a form 
of oppression. What are appropriate repercussions? Are other states responsible to these states in 
any capacity? These philosophical and theoretical gaps in literature as proposed above would 
help to create new ways of thinking about civil war as well as the relation of state and its people.  
 The Iraq War and rise of ISIL were two raindrops in a larger sea of violence and 
bloodshed. However, a closer look at their composition revealed that perhaps many civil 
conflicts share more in common than originally thought. Although each war may have a unique 
and exceptional set of circumstances that surrounds it, one cannot assume that finding a single 
solution to overcoming one particular civil war is equally as unique and exceptional. Rather, by 
changing the narrative of what drives civil war, one is also able to change the narrative to 
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